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ducted by the International 1nstiti:te for Applied Systems Analysis, 
and as such receive only limited scientific review. Views or opin- 
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This paper was prepared within the framework of research 
oriented towards the investigation of analytic tools used in 
global modeling. 
It tries to bridge the gap between the classical economic 
growth models and the global modeling efforts in which--because 
of the wide time horizon--a feedback must be included. 

Oy t i r ~ ~ i  z a t i o r .  o f  Demograph ic  P o l i c y  
- - -- .- - -- - - - - - - - - - 
i n  S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Growth Mode l s  
--- ~ 
A b s t r a c t  
The p a p e r  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  
m o d e l ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  t h r e e  main  f e e d b a c k s :  
1 )  a c c u r n ~ ! i a t i c n  of cap i t - a l  d u e  t o  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t s  
2 )  a c c u m u i a t i o n  o f  l a b o r  f o r c e  r e s u l t i n q  f r o m  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  d e m o g r a p h i c  
p o l i c y ,  and 
3 )  r . e c h n c a l  prog r - e s s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by g o v e r n m e n t  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  e d u c a t i o n ,  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e ,  
r e s e a r c h  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  e t c .  
U s i n ?  a n  o p t i m i z a t : i o n  t e c h n i q u e  c a l l e d  " t h e  f a c t o r  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e "  , t h e  optimum s t r a t e g y  o f  f a c t o r  
endowments h a s  been J c r i v e d .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  optimum 
s t r a t e g y  ctf gover-r1n:er:i-- e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  
was d e r i v e d  ( i n  a n  e x p l i c i t  f o r m )  and  a n a l y z e d  f o r  t h e  
c a s e  cf s h o r t  and l o n q  p l a n n i n g  h o r i . z o n s .  
I n  c % a s s i z a l  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  m o d e l s ,  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  
u s u a l l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  e x o g e n o u s  f a c t o r .  I t  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e l l -  
know:? t h a t  d e m o g r a p h i c  p o l i c y  h a s  3 c o n s i d e r a b l e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  a ~ d  f u i ~ l i r e  l a b o r  f a r c e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  [ G I  . S i n c e  
t h e  i rnplementa  t i o n  o f  a  d c m o q r a p h i c  p o l i c y  i ~ v o l v e s  d i r e c t  a n d  
i n d i r e c t .  c o s t s  i e . 9 .  t h e  s t i m u l - s t i o n  of  f e r t i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  
a  s y s t e m  o f  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  f o r  f a m i l i e s  w i t h  many c h i l d r e n  b e  
i m p l e m e n t e d ,  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  i n  t u r n  t h a t  a  
p r o g r a m  o f  new s c h o o l s ,  h o u s i n q ,  m e d i c a l  c a r e  e t c .  b e  i m p l e -  
m e n t e d ) ,  it- i s  i n p o r t a n t  i:o f i.nd out w h a t  derrioqraphic s t r a t e g y  
m a x i m i z e s  a g i v e n  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  pL3plzr i t  s h a l l  b e  shown ( a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  
s i m p l e  g r o w t h  m o d e l s )  t h a t  s u c h  a  s t r a t e g y  e x i s t s  a n d  t h a t  it 
c a n  b e  d e r i v e d  i n  a n  e x p l i c i t  f o r m .  F o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e ,  a n  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  t eckLr l ique  b a s e d  on  t h e  f a c t o r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  
w i l l  b e  u s e d .  
The a u t h o r  f e e l s  v e r y  much obi-iged t o  D r .  A .  R o g e r s  f o r  
a l l  h i s  r e m a r k s  a n d  comments .  
2. The Model 
Consider the socic-economic growth m ~ d e l  shown in Fig.1. 
The model employs a normative approach to planning and 
management, and 1s therefore characteristic of planned economies. 
The outpct (production) Y(t), is assumed to be dependent on the 
number of production (development) factors Y (t), v = I, ..., m, 
v 
~hich represent the> stock of capital (Y2) , labor (employment Y1), 
educztion, research and development, health services, etc. (yv 1 
v = 3 a . .  . ,m) . 
The decisinn center (D.C.) allocates the GNP Y among the 
different activities, v = I ,  ..., m [i.e. Y is spend on invest- 
ments ( Z  ) , wages ( %  ) and other government expenditures ( Z  2 1 v ' 
v = 3,. ..,m)] in such a way that the given utility function is 
maximized. 
As a consequence, growth is a result of the three main 
feedback effects: 
1) accumulation of capital Y2 due to the investments Z2; 
2) accumulation of labor force Y1 resulting from the 
government expenditures in demographic policy, Zd, which 
changes fertility, B, and population, N; 
3) technical progress represented by qovernment expenditures 
ZvI v = 3, ..., m, in education, research and development, 
etc. 
Using the general methodology developed in Ref.12-41 to the 
model of Fig.1, one can describe the mapping Z 
-+ Yv v -+ Y by the 
generalized Cobb-Douglas production function: 
where z (T) represents a factor endowment intensity. 
v 
There is a simple interpretation of Y2(z2) . The capital 
stock Y2 can be regarded as the accumulated investments z2(7), 
T - < t; fi2 - represents the depreciation (aging) of capital stock 
over time, while T2 is the construction delay, i.e. the time 
required for an investment fund to materialize in the form of 
new production capacity. The inertial effect of investments 
on plant capacity Y2(z2j is illustrated by Fig.2. 
FIGURE 2 
It is possi-bie to observe that plant capacity decreases 
for t 2T2 if no investments are made after t > T2. A similar 
interpretation (except for labor) can be given for the rest of 
the YV (zV) , v = 3,. . . ,m factors [2,4]. 
Assuming that the supply of labor is greater than the demand 
and taking into account that labor does not depend on past 
salaries (z,(T), T r t) one can set 6 1  -+ and T = 0  in (2) 1 
:';o that 
In the case when t-he demand for labor is greater than the 
supply, it is necessary to investigate the effect of demographic 
policy on the labor force supply. In particular, it is important 
to find the effect of government expenditures connected with 
the implementation of a demographic policy (zd) on fertility, F. 
It is well-known that in many developed countries, fertility 
decreases over time is a result of the change of GNP per capita, 
increasing health-service level, family planning, etc. In order 
to stimulate fertility growth, a broad program of social benefits 
is usually proposed. For example, in 1 9 6 0  about 1 . 8 5  percent of 
GNP was spent in Poland on additional monthly allowances, that 
rose in prcportion to the number of children. Since fertility 
continued to decrease up to 1972 the present system of social 
benefits in Poland (supplemented with the Acts of January 19, 
1972 and December 17, 1974) includes many additional benefits. 
From the point of view of systems analysis, it is important 
to know the elasticity a of fertility with respect to the d 
expenditures zd: 
Then one can try to construct a model of the general form 
where 
X - = the vector of exogenous variables including such 
factors as GNP per capita, health-service level, 
etc. 
The next step is to find the relation between fettility and 
the labor force variable L, which enters as the production 
factor in (1). In order to do that, it is necessary to employ 
a model of population growth. Following Ref.[ll, asstme that 
the births of the country concerned have gone through a certain 
trajectory, described by B(t) (the density of births), and assume 
a fixed life table that gives the number surviving to age a 
on radix unity, say p (a) . Then the number of persons a-t each 
age a at time t is equal to B(t-a)p(a) and by interpretation 
the total population at time t must be 
where p ( a )  = 0  f o r  a > w = t h e  l a s t  a g e  of  l i f e .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  d e r i v e  t h e  amount o f  people  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  
a g e s  o n e  h a s  t o  g e t  
where T  - 1 8  y e a r s  - t h e  e n t e r i n g  a g e  of  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t .  d  
A s s u n l i ~ g  t h a t  a  p a r t  t; ( t )  ( 0  < < ( t )  < 1 )  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
populo t ic in  i.n t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  a g e  g r o u p  c a n  b e  employed and i n t r o -  
a:~~-. ir :a  t h e  r i ew v a r i a b l e  -c = t - a  + T i n  t h e  i n t e g r a l  i n  ( 4 )  , d  
(:>lie g e t s  t h e  employed l a b o r  
S i n c e  n ( r )  =-- Z )  I where t ( r )  = f e m a l e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
r e p r o d u c t i v e  a g e s ,  one  c a n  w r i t e  ( 5 )  i n  t h e  form 
where 
The l a g  = 1  y e a r  be tween  B ( r )  and z ( r )  h a s  been  n e g l e c t e d .  d  
I n  t h e  s i m p l i f i e c ' ,  s i t u a t i o n  when F = " c o n s t a n t "  p ( t )  
d e c r e a s e s  e x p o n e n t i a l l y  w i t h  t h e  t i m e  c o n s t a n t  T ( t h e  a v e r a g e  
a  
d u r a t i o n  o t  l i f e ) ,  whi1.e < ( t )  i s  assumed t o  be  d e c r e a s i n g  a t  
f h e  same r a t e  ' - - <  a s  t h e  f e m a l e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  ( i . e .  
- 
N = 0. /N Thus one  o b t a i n s  
KO = a constant, 
whence 
which is almost identical to (2). In other words, the supply 
of labor behaves in a similar way to the supply of capital. 
There is a constant lag Td and the labor is aging at the rate 
-6 as in the depreciation of capital. d 
When the average wage w = const., the labor cost (Y1) in 1 
(1) should be proportional to (7). The impact of expenditures 
change z on the labor level change is similar to the impact of d 
investment change on the capital stock level. One can "invest" 
here in the population sector out of the present resources 
(i.e. GNP) in order to increase the labor force, which is the 
main production fact~r, in the future. 
Thus, from the point of view of optimization of long-term 
development, it is important to find out what is the best 
strategy for allocating GNP among investments, demographic ex- 
penditures, and individual and aggregate consumption. 
We shall investigate this problem in the next section, 
using the methodology of Ref.[2-41. 
3. Optimum Strategies 
The optimization problem which faces us can be formulated 
as follows: 
A 
Find the nonnegative functions zv(t) = zv(t) I v = 1 I - .  - I ~ I  
t &[O,TI which maximize the functional 
where E = t h e  g i v e n  d i s c o u n t  r a t e ,  T = g i v e n  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n ;  
s u b j e c t  t o  one  of  t h e  two se t s  of  c o n s t r a i n t s :  
a )  t h e  i n t e g r a l - t y p e  o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  
b )  t h e  a m p l i t u d e - t y p e  o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  
T - t  
where w (t) = ( l + c v )  E v  = g i v e n  p o s i t i v e  numbers.  v 
I n  t h e  s i m p l e  c a s e  where T = 0 ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  r e p l a c e  
v 
Z ( t )  by Y ( t - 1 ) .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  ( 1 1 )  h a s  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  meaning. The G N P  g e n e r a t e d  a t  t h e  end of  t h e  y e a r  
t - 1 i s  a l l o c a t e d  a t  t h e  y e a r  t among m development  f a c t o r s ,  i . e .  
where 
I n  t h e  c a s e  when some o f  t h e  government  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  s a y  
zo  
= y o Y ( t - l ) ,  have  no p r o d u c t i v e  e f f e c t ,  one  s h o u l d  w r i t e  
In the general case where T 0, one can write 
v 
Assuming that the average growth { = '/Y in [t-Tv,t] is 
constant it is also possible to write (12) in the form 
where 
The values Zv in (9) can be assumed to equal 
Obviously 
The growth rate under amplitude constraints (11) is charac- 
teristic for the closed economy (autarky) in which factor en- 
dowments are limited by the GNP currently achieved. In the case 
of integral constraints (9) and (1 0) , it is possible to make 
use of international cooperation by taking foreign credits, 
exchange of labor, etc. The credits should be paid back, 
however, together with the interest rates E v = 1, ..., m. 
A 
v 
In order to find the solution z (t), v = 1 ,  ..., m for the 
V 
integral constraints (9) one can use the generalized Hdlder 
inequality: 
1 
E v I f v  (t) (dt 
v= 1 
The upper bound in (15) is attained if the following 
conditions hold : 
v = 2,. . . ,m, t E [O,T]. The functions Yv(t) are integrable, so 
the conditions (1 6) should hold almost everywhere in [O,T] . 
The conditions (16) should be regarded as the necessary 
conditions of optimality and may be called the "factor co- 
ordination principle". According to that "principle", in order 
to get the maximum of Y it is necessary to spend the zv in a way 
~ u c h  that the development factors Y (z ) rise in fixed pro- 
v V 
r~ortions. It does not pay, for example, to increase the capital 
stock in production sectors if there is no skilled labor available 
or if the education level is not adequate. 
When a coordinated growth strategy is used (15) can be 
written as 
where 7 is the contribution to GNP resulting from the past 
decision: 
and 
represents the contribution to GNP in the planning interval 
[O ,TI resulting from the expenditures zV (t) t E [-Tv ,T-Tv] , 
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Zd = total expenditures in [O,T] . 
From (22) we. find also 
where 
A A 
A sketch of z z strategies for T = 25 years, T = 2 years, 
P' d P 
Td = 18 years is shown in Fig.3. 
FIGURE 3 
It is possible to observe that the expenditures zdit) 
A 
precede the z (t) by Td - T = 16 years. However, the effects 
P P 
Y (t) is proportional to Y (t) , accordinq to the factor coordi- d P A 
nation principle. When T < Td the strategv zd shifts outside 
[O,T], i.e. becomes completely exogenous. 
When a moving horizon technique is used for the planning of 
A A 
z z strategies, the values of real expenditures (envelopes p r A  dA 




As shown in [3] the value of AY under the optimum strategy 
z = z becomes 
- - 
where G is a constant depending on the parameters K, TI Tvl A v l  
and E ~ .  
A 
Now we can derive the optimum values of Zv = Zv, v = 1. ..., m, 
which maximize (24) subject to (10). Since (24) is strictly 
concave in the compact set (101, a unique optimum solution exists 
and can be derived by the formula 
When t h e  opt imum s t r a t e g y  i s  se t  i n  ( 2 4 ) ,  o n e  g e t s  
rn 
As; f o l . l o w s  from ( l q ) ,  g c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  as e q u a l  t o  1 T v  f 
gY. Then v=  1 so o n e  c a n  w r i t e  Z = 
* 
A s  shown i n  F i g . 4  a u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  Y = Y o f  ( 2 7 )  e x i s t s ,  
.,,qhich d e t e n n i n e s  t h e  GPJP g e n e r a t e d  w i t h i n  [O,T] u n d e r  t h e  
optimum s t r a t e g y .  
Since y < 1, the contraction property of the right side 
of (27) takes place for any given T or G ( T ) .  When one sets 
Z = gY the "open loop solutions" (19) (20) (25) become the "closed 
loop solutions". 
It should also be noticed that the expression (24) can be 
regarded as the utility function. For that purpose one can write 
where 
and 
w = prices attached to the Y V  factors. V 
h 
The problem of choosing the optimum values of Yv = Yv , 
v = 1, ... which maximize (28) subject to the constraint 
is obviously equivalent to (24) (25). 
As shown in Ref.[4], it is also possible to solve the 
general optimization problem (8)-(11) with the amplitude-type 
of constraints using the present methodology. The development 
under amplitude constraints (autarky) is always slower than in 
the case of integral constraints, i.e. an open economy, which 
makes possible an exchange of production factors with different 
regions and countries. 
4. Optimum Demographic Policy -
Keeping in mind the results of section three, we can now 
formulate recommendations regarding a demographic policy for the 
model of Fig.1. 
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i t  s h o u l d  be o b s e r v e d  t h a t  g i v e n  a  u t i l i t y  
f l i ! - ! c t . i ~n  o f  t h e  type i n  ! 2 8 )  , t h e  demograph i c  p o l i c y  c a n n o t  b e  
d e t a c h e d  f rom t h e  g e n e r a l  deve lopmen t  s t r a t e g y ,  wh ich  i s  con-  
c e r n e d  w i t h  the b e s t  a l ? - o c a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r  endcwrnents r e p r e s e n t e d  
by Z v ,  v = 1 ,  . . . ,  nl .  The b e s t  s t r a t e g y  s h o u l d  s a t i s f y  t h e  f a c t o r  
c o o r d i r . i a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  i n  ( 1  6) . Assuming t h a t  t h e  a g i n g  o f  t h e  
l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  s l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  a y i n q  of a l l  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  
, -  i . e .  d d  .- c' 
\j ' : j  = 1, .  . . ,m, and  t h a t  t h e  p l ann i -ng  h o r i z o n  i s  l o n g  
enough  (so that 'T.-'l' d . 0 and t h e  d ~ m o g r a p h i c  p o l i c y  c a n  b e  e x e r -  
c i s e d  w i t h i n  - t l , c ?  p l a n r ~ i n g  i n t e r v a l )  , o n e  g e t s  by v i r t u e  o f  (1  6 )  
whe re  Y (Z ) r r : p r c se r l t s  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  d u e  t o  d cl 
Zd e x p e n d i t ~ i r c s .  
The l a s t  r e l a t i o n  i n d i - c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d e m o g r a p h i c  p o l i c y  ( i n  
t e r m s  o f  Z ) d e t e r m i n e s  a l l  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  f a c t o r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
cl 
s t r a t e g i e s  z T j ,  \j = I , .  . . , m .  
T h a t  r e l a t i o n  a.l.so i n d i c a t e s  how i m p o r t a n t  t h e  demograph i c  
po l i . cy  i s  :'or t h e  l .o~iy-tcrnn p l a n n i ~ c ;  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h a t  p o l i c y ,  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the Lon!:]-range devcl .opment  g o a l s  o f  a  communi ty ,  
s h o u l d  n o t  b e  mixed up  w i t h  t h e  s h o r t - r a n g e  g o a l s ,  wh ich  a r e  
n ? o t i v a t e d  by, for .  e x a ~ l p l e ,  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a f a s t  improvement  
i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g ,  c o n s u ~ n p t i o n  p e r  c a p i t a ,  e tc .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a s h o r t - h o r i z o n  p o l i c y ,  T-Td < 0 ,  t h e  l a b o r  
force s h o u l d  be r e g a r d e d  as  an  exogenous  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n  i n  ( 1  1 . When o n e  w a n t s  t o  k e e p  f u l l  employment  (wh ich  
i n  many c o u n t r i e s ,  and f l r s t  o f  a l l  i n  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  
i s  a  n e c e s s i t y ) ,  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  z  ( t ) ,  v  $ 2 ,  are d e t e r m i n e d  
V 
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f a c t o r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  i n  ( 1 6 1 ,  by t h e  
s u p p l y  o f  l a b o r .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  b u i l d  new 
f a c t o r i e s  f c r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  g e t t i n g  f u l l  employment .  I n  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  t h e  economy s k ~ o u l d  a d j u s t  t o  t h e  random c h a n g e s  i n  
f e r t i l i t y  atld r e s u l t i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  and l a b o r  f o r c e  c h a n g e s .  
S uch  a s i t u a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  P o l a n d ,  w h e r e  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  
f l u c t u a t e s  o v e r  t i m e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n - a g e  s t r u c t u r e s  
shown in Fig.5 [ 8 ] .  As a result, the direct and indirect costs 
connected with the necessity of building new schools, hospitals, 
housing and social care programs also change over time. That 
in turn stimulates the discussion regarding the general question: 
what should the objectives of a rational policy in demography be? 
(See Ref. [5] . )  
AGE 
FIGURE 5 
The advocates of a curb on population growth argue that a 
considerable increase of GNP per capita could be obtained by 
spending the government expenditures zv  on the publicity of 
family planning (especially in rural areas), contraceptives, etc., 
which would result in a fertiiity decrease. The objectives of 
that policy presumably could be described by a utility function, 
which  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  Y a l s o  t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  p o p u l a t i o n  
g rowth  N(zd), i..e. 
where  a c c o r d i n g  LO ( Q )  
H i t )  =: i i ( t : j F ~ x j z  '-I. D 
- L I 
N ( t j  = f e m a l e  p o p u l a t i o n  . 
Using  t h e  f a c t o r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  optimum Z - D 
s t r a t e g y  c a n  b e  chosen  i n  such  a way t h a t  N[ZD] becomes i n v e r s e l y  
p r o p o r t i o ~ a l  t c ~  l:he yrowtfi o f  Y ( Z )  - . T h a t  s t r a t e g y  o b v i o u s l y  
would t e n d  t o  s m i m  t h  l?.bor-f o r c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  
Ano the r  o b j e c t i v e  of soc io-economic  g rowth  ( r e l a t e d  t o  GNP 
p e r  c a p i t a )  c o n c c r n s  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  r e a l  wages,  o r  t h e  wage- 
t o - p r i c e  r a t i c , .  It c a n  b e  shown ( i n  t h e  model a n a l y z e d )  t h a t  
t h e  l a s t  o b j e c t i v e  depends  m a i n l y  on  t h e  GNP-to-labor r a t i o ,  s o  
it sklould r a t h e r  he  r e a l i a e ?  by l o n g - t e r m  s t r a t e g y .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  
a v e r a g e  p r i c e  6 f o r  t h e  a g g r e g a t e d  p r o d u c t  X = Y / G ,  which can  
b e  w r i t t e n  
F = :  , C = p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t  , 
depends  on  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  Y = Zy/ovI  LI = 1,  ..., m f a c t o r s .  
V 
The e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n s  which a r e  p o s t u l a t e d  f o r  a  p l a n n e d  
economy, r e q u i r e  that Y b e  chosen  i n  s u c h  a  way t h a t  5 a t t a i n s  
A 'J 
a  minimum f o r  Y - Y v = 1 , . n .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  
\." 
attains a maximum and from the condition 
onc obtains 
A 
i.e. the equilibrium price p is equal to the marginal production 
costs a C / a X .  Since 
onc gets 
Y Taking into account the wages wl = y /L and introducing 1 
the relative price indices 
one gets 
where 
~ t .  f o l l o w s  f1,;;l-r (30) t h a t  t h e  r e a l  waqe i n c r e a s e  i s  
dett.rmin6.d h y  (;Z;rJ !jer- :?c\pic;;.rner.t, or t h e  i i - c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  
e f  f  i c i - e n z y  . 
S l n c e  ecorlor:;i.r: !.:ro.v.'-th j.s sf f t?c-l-ei-i k,y t . 1 1 ~  s o c i  al cos t : :  ( C s )  
of tile popula~;o;, : ~ r < i w t _ h ,  i t  Is  ; i l so  r . lecesszry t o  i.nve:;tj.i;ate 
* .  how t h e  v?ilut?  Y (1.~::. the GLIP gcncrcitrcc:' w i t h i n  [ O , T ] )  w i l l  
,-harlc;e. ~ r : p  c a p  2ss):me t h a t  c i s  : , " c n p o r t i o n a l  t o  N ( Z  ) SO t h a t  
s d 
r (id- 1 1 
- I c; .: C: '1 -d  y I.. i 
* * * 
and i n  t h e  solution ( 2 7 ) :  Y < Y , a s  shown i n  F i g . 4  by t h e  
dashet l  l i n e  . 
Many e x t e n s i o n s  of the probiem j u s t  d i s c u s s e d  a r e  p o s s i b l e .  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  i.t i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  m i g r a t i o n s  
be tween  ? i f f  :?:ent r e c j i o ~ i s  ~ n d  p ro r luc t i on  s e c t o r s  [ 7 ]  . For  t h e  
Po!.ish ecoliomy, . the  m c s t  i .mpor t an t  a r e  the m i g r a t i o n s  be tween  
thr- r l . i ra l  and u r h a n  a rec i s .  T h e r e  i s  a n  o u t f l o w  o f  l a b o r  o f  
, . lppruximate ly  one p e r c e n t .  pe r  y e a r  from t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l .  s e c t o r  
t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a i  and s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  
optirn*xn dcvelopfne:lt, t h e  d e n ~ y r a p ' r ~ i c  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  t a k e  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  b o t h  t h e  t - e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n q e s  and l a b o r  e f f i c i e n c i e s  
i n  a l l  o f  t h e  sect-ors o f  a  n a t i c n a l  economy. 
F o r  t .k~a t  purpo:-e, lt i s  n e c c s s a r y  t o  employ t h e  m u l t i -  
s e c t ~ r - - n o r m a !  i v e  model o f  deve lopmen t .  Such a  model h a s  been  
r e c e n r l y  cori.t.rnct.eci -11- t h e  P o l i s h  Academy o f  S c i e n c e s  [ 3 ]  . 
However, t h e  nptlrrlun~ democjrapl~ic  p o l i c y  f o r  t h a t  model  w i l l  b e  
d e s c r i b e d  cl s e w h ? r t 2 .  
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